Endogenous mergers and collusion in asymmetric market structures [documento eletrónico] / Mattias Ganslandt, Lars Persson, Helder Vasconcelos

GANSLANDT, Mattias; PERSSON, Lars, co-autor; VASCONCELOS, Helder, 1972-, co-autor

[s.l.: s.n.], 2011

"Recent empirical evidence shows that cartels are often asymmetric, while cartel theory sug-
gests that ?rm symmetry is conducive to collusion. Including an indivisible cost of cartelization,
we show that medium asymmetric market structures are more conducive to collusion, since they
balance the small ? firms? incentives to stay in the cartel against the need to cover the cartel
leaders? indivisible cartelization cost. Using an endogenous merger model, we also show that
forbidding mergers leading to symmetric market structures can induce mergers leading to asym-
metric market structures with a higher risk of collusion. Current anti-symmetry merger policy
can thus be counterproductive."

Economia

Economia; Mercado; Política-Comercial; Política-Económica

33

2011

Multimédia

ENG