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Cooperation vs. collusion.pdf    
TÍTULO/RESP.:

Cooperation vs. collusion [documento eletrónico] : how essentiality shapes co-opetition / Patrick Rey, Jean Tirole

AUTOR(ES):

REY, Patrick, 1957-TIROLE, Jean, co-autor

PUBLICAÇÃO:

[Toulouse]: Institut d' Economie Industrielle, 2013

COLECÇÃO:

TSE Working Paper; 439

NOTAS:

"The paper makes two related contributions. First, and in contrast with the rich body of literature on collusion with (mainly perfect) substitutes, it derives general results on the sustainability of tacit coordination for a class of nested demand functions that allows for the full range between perfect substitutes and perfect complements. Second, it studies the desirability of joint marketing alliances, an alternative to mergers. It shows that a combination of two informationfree regulatory requirements, mandated unbundling by the joint marketing entity and unfettered independent marketing by the firms, makes joint-marketing alliances always socially desirable, whether tacit coordination is feasible or not."

TEMA:

Economia

ASSUNTOS:

Economia industrialMarketingCompetitividade

CDU:

33

DATA PUB.:

2013

TipoReg:

Multimédia

LÍNGUA:

ENG

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