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**SUBSCRIBER LINE
RESALE OFFER**

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- SUBSCRIBER LINE RESALE OFFER -

0. General Observations

This document is available for public consultation for a two-month period. Having regard to the fact that responses received shall be publicly announced in the website of ANACOM (<http://www.anacom.pt>), responses must be submitted within the referred time limit to the following e-mail address: orla@anacom.pt. Possible elements of a confidential nature included in the responses shall be clearly identified, so that we can ensure the information is inaccessible.

In the knowledge that the positions of all participants are essential for the analysis of the different aspects related to the subscriber line resale offer, which shall introduce greater competition in the telecommunication sector, and particularly in the market of fixed communications, ANACOM shall attach the utmost importance to your contribution, which must be as substantiated as possible.

1. Regulatory Activity

The Lisbon European Council, of 23-24/03/00, following prior Councils, enhanced the full potential of a digital economy based on knowledge, namely as regards growth, competitiveness and employment creation, underlining the importance, within this context, of an access to a communications infrastructure of reduced prices and high quality and to a wide range of services¹.

The European Commission (EC), on the other hand, has recurrently highlighted the pursuit of similar objectives, through the promotion of an open and competitive European market of communication services, particularly in the sphere of the Internet and broadband access. The program of the XV Constitutional Government likewise establishes goals such as a general broadband Internet access as well as the general access and use of telecommunications networks by operators through the promotion of competition and alternative infrastructures and the opening of the local loop in fair conditions.

ANACOM has taken timely and successive measures with a view to promote competition at the level of the local access, namely: a) the granting of licenses in the scope of the fixed wireless access (FWA); b) the implementation of the indirect access, through the call-by-call selection and carrier pre-selection, and the successive enlargement of the traffic eligible for the purpose; c) the putting into operation of the unbundled access to the local loop; d) the alteration of the regime applicable to the Internet, the retail price of which is now established by the Internet Service Provider (ISP), with a reduction of the interconnection prices; e) the introduction of operator portability in the fixed network and in the Integrated Services Digital Network (ISDN); f) the effective safeguard of the principle of non-discrimination regarding the supply of services by PT Comunicações, S.A. (PTC) where this supply is carried out

¹ See <http://ue.eu.int/Newsroom/LoadDoc.asp?BID=76&DID=60942&from=&LANG=1>

simultaneously with the enterprises belonging to the PT Group and competitor enterprises, namely as to the ADSL offer.

These measures, among others, have contributed for a competition level in Portugal, as the 8th Report from the Commission on the Implementation of the Telecommunications Regulatory Package² already pointed out, that is increasingly comparable with that of the remaining Member States of the European Union (EU), in spite of the different timetable for the liberalization established for Portugal.

Most recently, in the context of specific offers, the suspension of the offer "PT Network Line without Subscription" was determined, until PTC presents the remaining operators with the possibility of submitting the same type of offers, through the Deliberation of ANACOM of 10/04/03³. The fact that the new providers of the fixed telephone service (FTS), the entry in the market of which is rendered easy by the indirect access, are deprived of the possibility to present a similar offer, as to this service provision modality, was decisive to this determination.

The introduction of a wholesale offer of the subscriber line resale, already weighted by several telecommunication national regulatory authorities (NRA), shall enable operators and service providers that adhere to this type of offer, on the one hand, to develop their own retail offers, adding value to the final client through the creation of innovative services and, on the other hand, to compete with the offers of the operator who owns the network that aggregate, in optional plans, the access price and the telephone traffic price. Moreover, there is a general consensus at EU level that the introduction of the unbundled access to the local loop (ULL) and the development of the indirect access are not yet sufficient for an effective competition in the market of the fixed communications.

The processes of implementation of wholesale offers of the subscriber line resale, notwithstanding the positive aspects identified by most of the entities that have assessed this issue, have presented very long implementation periods. This situation is due to the technical and operational complexity inherent to the provision itself, requiring a very participated and transparent approach.

Question 1

Do you consider the development of a wholesale offer of the subscriber line resale as an appropriate additional measure to promote, namely, innovation in retail offers as well as competition in the market of the fixed communications, with the resulting advantages for final consumers?

² Hereinafter referred to as "8th Implementation Report" (see http://europa.eu.int/information_society/topics/telecoms/implementation/annual_report/8threport/index_en.htm).

³ See <http://www.anacom.pt/template12.jsp?categoryId=64089>

2. The Subscriber Line Resale Offer


2.1 Definition

The above-mentioned technical complexity requires a clear and precise definition of the offer. Therefore, the subscriber line resale offer hereby proposed⁴ consists in a wholesale offer, at a determined price, of the right to bill the telephone line⁵ of PTC. The SLRO is supposed to allow the beneficiaries to establish their own retail offer that integrates the line resale along with other services.

Without prejudice to the already registered positive evolution, several NRAs have developed new ways of stimulating competition in the FTS, namely taking the view that the introduction of the ULL and the indirect access are still insufficient. Among those ways, the obligation to offer a subscriber line resale by operators with significant market power (SMP) may be highlighted. This type of provision has been developed in Ireland, Denmark, Norway and the United Kingdom, whereas in several other Member States of the EU it is still being studied.

To clarify the SLRO concept, the telecommunications services may be divided conceptually in two levels: (a) the network operations, such as interconnection and access, wherein the relationships between public network operators (NOs) are established, and (b) the retail services, comprising the provision of services to the final client by other service providers (SPs). In this scope, the NOs produce services at the level of network operations only, namely services relating to call origination, traffic and termination, whereas service providers carry out activities at the level of retail services, namely providing sales and promotions services, service creation, contracts with clients, billing and collecting.


Picture 1 – Present situation



⁴ Hereinafter referred to as “SLRO”.

⁵ Value to be given for the item “telephone line”, included in the “monthly subscription” heading of the FTS bill of PTC.

Picture 2 – SLRO



On the other hand, the SLRO allows customers that adhere to a certain service provided over the subscriber line the possibility of receiving in the same bill the amount relating to the network line subscription and the charge for services provided by the operator concerned, who shall determine both retail prices, as shown in Picture 2. However, one should bear in mind that, although for the subscribers in general SLRO is sufficient for the existence of a single bill, there may be cases where this situation might not occur, as some subscribers shall still have available the indirect access⁶ and Internet functionalities, which shall be billed and collected by the respective entities, unless they agree something otherwise with the beneficiary of the SLRO. Likewise, the subscriber may also use services that are not within the scope of the SLRO, a situation examined in point 2.2.

According to the proposed definition, the maintenance and repair of the network line and related infrastructure are still incumbent upon PTC. However, when the SLRO is put in operation, it shall be incumbent upon the final client to contact the beneficiary of the SLRO and inform it of aspects concerning the service quality. The beneficiary shall then contact PTC, that must ensure service quality levels in appropriate and non-discriminatory conditions.

Within this context, the development of an offer such as the SLRO grants its beneficiary the possibility of developing its own retail offers, adding value to the final client through the creation of innovative services, and competing with the offers of PTC that aggregate, in optional plans, the access price and the telephone traffic price.

Question 2

Do you consider the SLRO, as presented in this document, to be an appropriate solution for the promotion of competition in the market of fixed communications? Do you identify other wholesale offers for the subscriber line that best achieve the goals above-mentioned, namely the creation of the appropriate conditions for the development of competition and of innovative offers? Discuss the impacts of this

⁶ Regardless of the SLRO, it is still possible for the subscriber to opt for more than one pre-selected operator (according to the type of eligible traffic), for the call-by-call selection and for the alteration of its pre-selected operator, in case the subscriber has already adhered to that functionality.

solution on the development of further offers, assessing the advantages and drawbacks thereof.

2.2 Networks and services comprised

There are different types of access, namely the analogue access (mainly used by residential subscribers), the basic ISDN access (required by residential and business final clients) and the primary ISDN access (specially used by business subscribers). It must be taken into account that in the business segment the competition level is more emphasized than in the residential segment. On the other hand, simplification of the relationship with the SP may be more relevant in the residential market. Thus, the establishment of different priority degrees as to the SLRO implementation, according to the type of access line, is a possibility – having regard to the expected results of competition development, to the short and medium term benefits for the consumer and to the procedural and to the technical swiftness of the different solutions to be adopted.

In case of a phased introduction, the SLRO may turn out to constitute an obligation for PTC, being an entity with SMP in the market of the fixed subscribers networks and/or fixed telephone services, as regards the analogue line, in which case its extension to the ISDN lines shall be assessed according to the expected demand level for that offer. Concerning the primary accesses, the existence of alternative means and technologies that allow licensed operators to present offers that compete with those of PTC must be particularly examined.

In this respect, it must be mentioned that OFTEL and ComReg determined, on 11/03/03 and 12/02/03, respectively, the inclusion of the ISDN lines in the wholesale subscriber line offers to be made available by British Telecom and Eircom, respectively.

The existence of a set of additional services/service facilities, possibly of a residual character, provided by PTC, must also be considered and its integration in the SLRO must be assessed. At present, some of these services may be the following: services relating to the calling line identification, namely the presentation and/or restriction of calling number identification; services relating to call management, such as call forwarding and barring; intelligent network services, such as calls to non-geographic numbers, particularly freephone services and shared cost call services; services for the consultation and management of the voice mailbox; billing and collecting mechanisms of the Internet access services, according to the provisions established in the Reference Internet Access Offer (RIAO)⁷; the short messaging service (SMS); and the leasing of terminal equipment.

Having PTC the right to charge the final client for the provision of additional services/service facilities, these may have a residual character, and, *per se*, do not justify the billing by PTC, as far as efficiency and simplification of relationship with the final client are concerned. Thus, in a scenario where PTC is obliged to make the

⁷ See <http://www.ptcomunicacoes.pt/operadores/>

SLRO available, it seems appropriate, alternatively, that PTC is given the right to charge the final client for those services through the SLRO beneficiary, at the retail prices established by PTC. Without prejudice to the afore-mentioned, the beneficiary may be remunerated for the costs incurred in the billing and collecting of the additional services/service facilities.

It must be noted that the existence of a bill with a tendency to be single depends, for a large part, although not exclusively, on the extension of the range of non-geographical services eligible for the indirect access. This issue is currently under analysis, namely within the scope of a public consultation on carrier pre-selection to be carried out by ANACOM, the result of which shall be taken into account as regards the SLRO.

Question 3

On your opinion, over what type of access is the existence of the SLRO appropriate, namely having regard to the benefits for final clients, the possibility of substitution on the supply side, and the simplification and swiftness of implementation? Do you find it necessary/appropriate to include in the SLRO the additional services/service facilities provided by PTC, on the resold network lines? Please identify the services and solutions you deem appropriate.

2.3 Prices

The achievement of the objectives inherent to the SLRO, particularly competition and the diversified development of retail offers, depends for a large part on the prices established for this offer. At present, PTC, being an entity with SMP in the market of the fixed subscribers networks and/or fixed telephone services, leased lines and interconnection, has the obligation for cost orientation of prices. In this context, and considering that the SLRO is an obligation upon PTC, being an entity notified with SMP, the application of the principle of cost orientation of prices – one of the obligations that may be maintained, under the new Community regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services⁸, in markets where no effective competition exists – seems to be the most appropriate option.

Within this context, the most adequate methodology to establish prices must be determined. The main methodologies are presented bellow. and it must be taken into account that not all of them are mutually exclusive.

(a) Long run incremental costs (LRICs)

In competitive markets, the LRICs, which are compatible with effective and sustainable entries in the market, constitute the basis for the decisions of undertakings, that take thus into account the use of the most modern and efficient technologies.

⁸ Hereinafter referred to as “New regulatory framework”.

Therefore, the resource to these costs in the market regulation leads in principle to an orientation of prices to competitive levels. The use of the LRICs to determine, in particular, interconnection prices was recommended by the EC⁹.

However, in the specific case of services associated to the access network, the putting into operation of a cost methodology based in LRICs may be very time consuming, namely because it implies the resource to price and cost elements practised at present by service and/or equipment suppliers, that in general are not public nor uniform, and because it requires the calibration of a very wide and complex set of cost parameters (such as labour remuneration, network dimensions and costs of ducts, masts and equipment).

Moreover, the resource to LRICs, namely if associated with the use of current costs, may lead to prices higher than those charged at present for the network line subscription (which concern historic costs), as: (i) the local loop may be distinguished by a more intensive use of labour than the remaining network components, and the current remuneration levels of this factor of production are relatively higher than the levels relating to the historic costs; and (ii) the use of LRICs implies the valuation at current prices of the equipment and infrastructure necessary to the service production, whereas in terms of the historic costs only the value of the equipment and infrastructure used for service production which has not been amortized in the accounts is used.

(b) LLU related costs

The prices relating to the SLRO could be determined from the LLU, as both offers share several components. However, some costs are relevant in the scope of the LLU but not relevant as far as the SLRO is concerned, and vice-versa. Thus it would be necessary to adjust the ULL prices, so that they would show the specific features of the SLRO.

This approach was adopted by OFTEL. In the specific case of British Telecom, the use of this methodology lead to prices of the SLRO equivalent service, called “wholesale line rental”, which are higher than the retail prices, as the network access in the United Kingdom is still financed with revenues from traffic, which means that the tariff rebalancing is not yet finalised.

However, it must not be excluded that the use of a cost methodology based on the LLU, is not only complex, but may also lead to wholesale prices higher than the retail prices practised by the operator with SMP.

(c) Historic costs

An approach based on historic costs would calculate the cost of the subscriber line rental, excluding the costs regarding avoidable retail activities (marketing, for example), and establish a cost planning, making use, namely, of estimates as to cost

⁹ Commission Recommendation 98/195/EC of 8 January 1998 on interconnection in a liberalised telecommunications market.

variation and productivity evolution, adding in the end the costs incurred specifically with the SLRO.

This type of approach has the advantage of using cost elements present in the cost-accounting system of PTC. The monthly subscription has been traditionally in deficit, although the tariff rebalancing is now practically completed. On the other hand, there is a relative uncertainty regarding the development expected for unitary costs, which depend on the level of costs and on the total of accesses. Thus it should not be excluded, also in this case, that the settled cost might be higher than the retail price practised at present by the operator who owns the network. This could lead to a situation of margin squeeze, arising *a priori* some difficulties as to the purpose of competition promotion, notwithstanding the fact that the margin under consideration could be recovered by means of traffic revenues.

(d) European current practices

The use of the European current practises is also possible in the process of price determination within the SLRO. Nevertheless, this type of approach is not advisable, having regard to the different rebalancing degree of the retail prices that exists in the EU in general, as the 8th Implementation Report has pointed out. Furthermore, the different cost structures of the access network of the several operators who own the network and the different ways of implementing this type of offer may lead to reasoned price differences.

(e) “Retail minus”

The “retail minus” approach, according to which the wholesale price of a service is obtained by subtracting an amount to the retail price of that service, or of a similar service, was adopted, within the SLRO, by the regulatory authorities of Denmark (retail – 21%), Ireland (retail – 8,5%) and Norway (retail – 16%). This approach ensures that the wholesale price is lower than the retail price, thereby avoiding, in principle, situations of margin squeeze and reduces the risk associated to the market.

In particular, a cost methodology of the “retail minus” type is considered to gather a set of benefits that are not to be slighted. In this framework, the following advantages may be highlighted: a relatively easy implementation; its proportionality in view of the problem under consideration; its adequacy towards the promotion of competition; the incentive provided for the minimisation of costs, by limiting the remuneration of the operator who owns the network; the possibility offered to the operator who owns the network to recover the costs of the service under consideration; and there are reasonable requirements as to information on costs, as it is only necessary to use existent information, duly audited.

Question 4

Do you agree with the application of the principle of cost orientation of prices within the SLRO? If yes, which cost methodology do you deem most appropriate for the pursuit of that principle, in the scope of the subscriber line resale offer?

2.4 Beneficiaries

The provision of services in a subscriber line may generally involve the following agents:

- a) PTC, that provides the direct access service, and therefore the rental of the subscriber line and related traffic, as well as the additional services/service facilities;
- b) OLL(s), that provide pre-selection services for national calls and/or pre-selection services for international calls and/or call-by-call selection services and/or broadband services; and
- c) ISP(s), that provide broadband services and/or Internet dial-up services and/or voice over Internet services.

The determination of the entities that may benefit from the SLRO must be carried out based on the purposes established for that offer and on its potential advantages. In that scope, it is appropriate to ensure that all agents providing services on a certain subscriber line, and only these, benefit from equivalent possibilities of aggregating services, so that they may compete in the same conditions.

The FTS providers seem, in principle, the first entities that benefit with the SLRO, having regard to its relationship with the final client. In this context, it must be pointed out that the operator pre-selection functionality allows operators without their own infrastructure to provide FTS, thereby making them direct competitors of PTC as far as that service is concerned. On the contrary, the sporadic character of the bond between an operator that only provides a call-by-call selection and its client leads to a non-representative weight of the traffic of that type of operator in the total traffic of the client. Thus, if an operator that only provides a call-by-call selection is a beneficiary of the SLRO, the advantages related to the offer shall not be enjoyed fully. In an extreme situation, the entity under consideration could bill the subscriber line without having provided any communications service in the respective period.

Moreover, operators without their own infrastructure generally also provide broadband services, competing with entities that provide that type of services only. Thus, the latter should have the possibility of making available to their clients the aggregation of the subscriber line and the broadband services in the same bill. The definition of a specific wholesale offer that allows to aggregate, at retail level, an Internet service supported in ADSL technology and the access to the FTS, is a way to

surpass the indissociability verified in practise between the ADSL service and the FTS, which, in the opinion of several entities, is an important obstacle to the development of the ADSL service, at least in those cases where the client does not show any interest in the FTS service. Furthermore, the voice service may also be provided by ISPs, whether in the dial-up regime or in the broadband regime, although with different service quality levels, in addition to the offer of other telecommunication services.

Question 5

Bearing in mind the purposes and advantages related to the SLRO, which are the entities that in your opinion should be beneficiaries of the subscriber line resale offer?

2.5 Process

The SLRO should be provided to beneficiaries in non-discriminatory and equal conditions, being up to the client to choose the provider with whom it wishes to establish a relationship¹⁰. In addition, the SLRO implementation process must be initiated by the SLRO beneficiary, supported by a document duly signed by the client, requesting of PTC the implementation thereof.

The client may subsequently change the effective SLRO beneficiary, namely in view of a better offer. In those cases, and in the same way as for the process of the implementation of the offer, the new SLRO beneficiary, duly qualified for the purpose with a document properly signed by the client, shall notify that decision to PTC, that shall see to the necessary changes, so as to carry out the requested alteration.

Furthermore, it is important to assess the need to establish a guard period, following the adhesion to the SLRO, during which PTC is prevented from carrying out any action designed to win back clients, so that the latter may make a free and reasoned choice of the desired service.

As regards the operator pre-selection¹¹, by Determination of the Board of Directors of 17/07/03, a 6-month period was determined to achieve the established purpose, that is, to provide the client with the necessary amount of time to fully enjoy the service of the pre-selected provider, trying it out and remaining free to continue being a client or to release itself from the contract, without being under any external pressure.

¹⁰ Hereinafter referred to as “Effective SLRO beneficiary”.

¹¹ (see <http://www.anacom.pt/template12.jsp?categoryId=78950>)

Question 6

Do you agree with the processes for the choice and alteration of the effective SLRO beneficiary, as described briefly in this document? Do you find it necessary to establish a guard period for the SLRO? In your opinion, what would be the appropriate time limit for that period?

2.6 Reference offer and working group

Having regard to the specific features inherent to the definition and implementation of the SLRO, it seems important that the conditions applicable to the SLRO are the subject of a specific Reference Offer, comprising a set of minimum elements. Among these elements, it should, namely, be included information on: prices; billing; payment conditions; deadlines; quality of service indicators and compensation for nonfulfilment; relationship with the client; dispute resolution; and process regarding the SLRO request.

As regards the quality of service, the SLRO should not conflict with the indicators and purposes of quality of service established for the other services provided on the same subscriber line, without prejudice to, additionally, specific indicators being determined for the SLRO, namely at the level of the wholesale relationship between PTC and the effective SLRO beneficiary.

Having been noticed the need for a close cooperation between the entities involved in the offer, as well as the complexity concerning the putting into operation thereof, and as what was defined within the LLU, the establishment of a specific working group in the scope of the SLRO is deemed advisable. Its task would be the promotion of the necessary conditions for an appropriate putting into operation of the SLRO, particularly involving ANACOM, the beneficiaries of the offer and consumer associations.

Question 7

Do you agree with the need for a Reference Offer for the SLRO? If yes, which issues should be included in this document? In this context, do you deem appropriate the determination of specific quality of service indicators for the SLRO, namely at the level of the wholesale relationship between PTC and the effective SLRO beneficiary? If yes, which indicators should be defined? Do you find it appropriate to establish a working group with a view to promote the necessary conditions for an adequate putting into operation of the SLRO? If yes, please identify the issues you deem relevant to be comprised in the reference terms thereof.

3. Implementation

The experience identified in other countries concerning the deadliness for the development of similar offers to the SLRO, having regard to the technical and

operational complexities of the related processes, as well as a lack of a collaboration tradition among national operators, leads, reasonably enough, to the analysis and discussion of the regulatory framework that supports the obligation upon PTC to make this wholesale offer available. In this context, the SLRO is deemed to be compatible with the provisions of the present and future regulatory frameworks.

The regulatory framework in force, foreseen for the transition to a situation of full competition in the interconnection and FTS markets, is consubstantiated through the provisions of Decree-Law no. 415/98 of 31/12/98 and of Decree-Law no. 474/99 of 08/11/99, that transpose Directives 97/33/EC and 98/10/EC¹², respectively. In this framework, the obligation of entities with SMP to comply with the principle of non-discrimination as far as interconnection offers are concerned should be pointed out, as expressed in article 8 of Decree-Law no. 415/98 and article 33 of the Regulations for Operation of the FTS. This obligation is expressed, namely, through the offer by those entities of the conditions, particularly information and special network access facilities, which they apply to their own services, subsidiaries or associates to those requesting interconnection who have similar services and who are in similar conditions.

According to the new regulatory framework, the *ex ante* regulation shall constitute an adequate mean of intervention in markets where there is no effective competition. Within this scope, following the identification of undertakings with a dominant position in the relevant markets, ANACOM should decide on the imposition, maintenance, amendment or withdrawal of obligations upon these entities. Directive 2002/19/EC of 07/03/02 on access to, and interconnection of, electronic communications networks and associated facilities, identifies, in articles 8 to 13, the obligations to be imposed, according to what is appropriate, on undertakings with SMP, namely: transparency, non-discrimination, accounting separation, access to and use of specific network facilities, price control and cost accounting.

¹² See <http://www.anacom.pt/template20.jsp?categoryId=5149&contentId=16691>,
<http://www.anacom.pt/template20.jsp?categoryId=5188&contentId=16901>,
<http://www.anacom.pt/template20.jsp?categoryId=5188&contentId=16903>,
<http://www.anacom.pt/template20.jsp?categoryId=5188&contentId=49421>,
http://europa.eu.int/smartapi/cgi/sqa_doc?smartapi!celexapi!prod!CELEXnumdoc&lg=en&numdoc=31997L0033&model=guichett and http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/en/oj/dat/1998/l_101/l_10119980401en00240047.pdf

ANNEX – Main Consulted Documents

1. Community Documents

1.1. Legislation

Directive 97/33/EC on interconnection in Telecommunications with regard to ensuring universal service and interoperability through application of the principles of Open Network Provision (ONP)

(http://europa.eu.int/smartapi/cgi/sga_doc?smartapi!celexapi!prod!CELEXnumdoc&lg=en&numdoc=31997L0033&model=guichett)

Directive 98/10/EC on the application of open network provision (ONP) to voice telephony and on universal service for telecommunications in a competitive environment

(http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/en/oj/dat/1998/l_101/l_10119980401en00240047.pdf)

Directive 2002/19/EC on access to, and interconnection of, electronic communications networks and associated facilities (Access Directive)

(http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/en/oj/dat/2002/l_108/l_10820020424en00070020.pdf)

Directive 2002/21/EC on a common regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services (Framework Directive)

(http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/en/oj/dat/2002/l_108/l_10820020424en00330050.pdf)

Directive 2002/22/EC on universal service and users' rights relating to electronic communications networks and services (Universal Service Directive)

(http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/en/oj/dat/2002/l_108/l_10820020424en00510077.pdf)

Recommendation 2003/311/EC on Relevant Product and Service Markets within the electronic communications sector susceptible to *ex ante* regulation in accordance with Directive 2002/21/EC

(http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/en/oj/dat/2003/l_114/l_11420030508en00450049.pdf)

1.2. Others

- Presidency Conclusions of the Lisbon (23-24/03/00) and Santa Maria da Feira (19-20/06/00) European Councils

(<http://ue.eu.int/Newsroom/LoadDoc.asp?BID=76&DID=60942&from=&LANG=1> and <http://ue.eu.int/Newsroom/LoadDoc.asp?BID=76&DID=62076&from=&LANG=1>)

- 8th Report from the Commission on the Implementation of the Telecommunications Regulatory Package – European telecoms regulation and markets 2002 – COM(2002)695

(http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/com/rpt/2002/com2002_0695en01.pdf)

2. National Documents

2.1. Legislation

- Decree-Law no. 415/98, that establishes the interconnection regime between public telecommunication networks within a framework of open and competitive markets, so as to allow the inter-operation of telecommunication services for public use, and defines the general principles applicable to numbering

(<http://www.anacom.pt/template12.jsp?categoryId=7939>)

- Decree-Law no. 474/99, that approves the Regulations for the Operation of the FTS

(<http://www.anacom.pt/template20.jsp?categoryId=5188&contentId=16901>)

- Decree-Law no. 309/2001, on the Statutes of ICP – ANACOM

(<http://www.anacom.pt/template20.jsp?categoryId=4675&contentId=17645>)

- Decree-Law no. 31/2003, that amends the Basis of the Public Telecommunications Service Concession

(<http://www.anacom.pt/template20.jsp?categoryId=5161&contentId=89968>)

2.2. Others

- Determination of ANACOM of 02/06/99 on SMP declarations

(<http://www.anacom.pt/template13.jsp?categoryId=7956>)

- Competition in Local Access: public survey launched by ANACOM on 10/07/00
(<http://www.anacom.pt/template12.jsp?categoryId=3008>)
- Determination of ANACOM of 03/08/00 on SMP evaluation
(<http://www.anacom.pt/template13.jsp?categoryId=67980>)
- Competition in Local Access – Results of the public survey – Opinion of ICP
(<http://www.anacom.pt/template12.jsp?categoryId=3008>)
- Determination of ANACOM of 24/05/02 on the previous notice of the “PT ADSL Network” offer
(<http://www.anacom.pt/template12.jsp?categoryId=40949>)
- Determination of ANACOM of 14/06/02 on the disclosure of retail offers based on the “PT ADSL Network” offer
(<http://www.anacom.pt/template12.jsp?categoryId=38016>)
- Determination of ANACOM of 17/01/03 on the "PT Network Line without Subscription" offer
(<http://www.anacom.pt/template12.jsp?categoryId=53241>)
- Determination of ANACOM of 04/04/03 on the “PT First Time ADSL” offer
(<http://www.anacom.pt/template12.jsp?categoryId=63229>)

3. Remaining Documents

3.1. The Netherlands

- Price Squeeze Consultation Document – OPTA – 09/10/00
(<http://www.opta.nl/download/pricesqueezeeng.pdf>)
- Price Squeeze Guidelines – OPTA and NMa – 28/02/01
(http://www.opta.nl/download/direc_pricesqueeze_280201.pdf)

3.2. Ireland

- ComReg's Decision D13/02, on CPS in Ireland 2002
(http://www.odtr.ie/_fileupload/publications/odtr0264.pdf)
- ComReg's Decision D2/03, on the implementation of CPS single billing products (wholesale line rental, agency rebilling and wholesale ancillary services)
(http://www.odtr.ie/_fileupload/publications/comreg0307.pdf)
- ComReg's document 03/24, on pricing issues concerning the wholesale line rental
(http://www.odtr.ie/_fileupload/publications/ComReg0324.pdf)

3.3. *Norway*

- Standard Agreement on Resale of Services, etc., in the Landline Field between TDC Tele Danmark A/S and XXXXX – 01/11/00
- Resale of subscription in the fixed network – NPT – 11/11/02

3.4. *United Kingdom*

- Protecting consumers by promoting competition – Consultation on OFTEL's review of the fixed telephony market – 31/01/02
(<http://www.oftel.gov.uk/publications/pricing/2002/pcr0102.pdf>)
- Protecting consumers by promoting competition: OFTEL's conclusions – 20/07/02
(<http://www.oftel.gov.uk/publications/pricing/2002/pcr0602.pdf>)
- Promoting competition in telephone services – New “Line and Calls” services – A consumer guide – 10/02
(<http://www.oftel.gov.uk/publications/consumer/consguides/lccg1002.pdf>)
- Wholesale Line Rental – A consultation document issued by the Director General of Telecommunications – 14/11/02
(http://www.oftel.gov.uk/publications/whole_line/2002/wlr1102.pdf)
- Wholesale Line Rental: OFTEL's conclusions – statement – 11/03/03
(http://www.oftel.gov.uk/publications/whole_line/2003/wlr0303.pdf)